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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffTPetitionerCross Respondent,
CaseNo.20040078-SC
v.
GERMAN CRUZ REYES,
Defendant/RespondentCross Petitioner.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling that the
reasonable doubt instruction given in this case violated this Court's "constitutionally flawed"
three-part test. State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, \ 22, 84 P.3d 841 (addendum A).1
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Is this Court's three-part test governing reasonable doubt instructions
"constitutionally flawed," as the court of appeals unanimously concluded?

1

This Court also granted defendant's cross-petition challenging the court of appeals'
holding that refusing to repeat certain instructions at the close of evidence was harmless
error. The State will respond to defendant's argument on that issue in its Brief of CrossRespondent.

On a writ of certiorari, this Court will "review the court of appeals' decision for
correctness and give its conclusions of law no deference." Newspaper Agency Corp. v.
Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The question presented does not require this Court to interpret any constitutional
provisions, statutes, or rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information dated 24 March 2002 with aggravated sexual
assault, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405 (1999). R. 6-8. The
information was later amended to include a second count of aggravated sexual assault. R.
34-36.
A jury found defendant guilty on both counts. R. 184-86. He was sentenced to two
concurrent terms of 15 years to life. R. 197-98. Defendant timely appealed. R. 203-04.
This Court transferred the case to the court of appeals, which reversed and remanded. R.
225; Reyes, 2004 UT App 8. The State petitioned for certiorari to challenge the court of
appeals' ruling that the reasonable doubt instruction given in this case violated the United
States Constitution. Defendant cross-petitioned for certiorari to challenge the court of
appeals' ruling that the timing of the jury instructions, though erroneous, was harmless. This
Court granted both petitions.

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
On Valentine's Day 2002, Ashley and three friends went to Bricks, a Salt Lake City
dance club. R. 229: 20-21. About an hour and a half after arriving, Ashley stepped outside
because she was expecting a phone call from her boyfriend. R. 229: 21-22.

She was

wearing a tank top and black leather pants and feeling "kind of tipsy" from some tequila she
had consumed earlier. R. 229: 22.
Defendant drove up, waved Ashley over, and said, "Come here." R. 229: 23-25,4647. He was not a typical Bricks patron: his head was shaved, and he was wearing a
"hoodie."3 R. 229: 25, 71, 74. Ashley walked over and said, "Can I bum a cigarette?" R.
229:47. He said, "Yeah, come around to the passenger side." R. 229: 26. Ashley walked
around to the passenger side and sat down in the car, but left the door open and let her feet
"dangle out." R. 229: 26, 74. She had no intention of going anywhere. R. 229: 26.
Defendant started driving away, so Ashley put her feet in and shut the door.
Defendant said he had no cigarettes, but would go to a gas station and buy her some. R. 229:
27. As they drove, the two told each other their names and ages. R. 229: 27. Ashley was
18; defendant, who is 40, said he was 26. R. 229: 28-29, 149. They did not discuss sex. R.
229: 44, 51. Ashley does not speak Spanish, but defendant, who spoke in broken English,
"definitely knew enough to communicate." R. 229: 28, 47.

2

Except as otherwise noted, the facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah 1993).
3

A "hoodie" is a hooded sweatshirt.
3

Ashley directed defendant to a nearby 7-Eleven. R. 229: 28. When they were about
halfway there, she received a call from her boyfriend. R. 229: 28, 52. When they got to the
store, Ashley told defendant to get Camel Lights, and he went in to buy them. R. 229: 29.
After he got back into the car, Ashley, who was starting to get nervous, asked, "Are we going
back to Bricks now?" Defendant said, "Yeah." R. 229: 29.
On the way back to Bricks, defendant stopped the car in an alley near the railroad
tracks. R. 229: 32. A factory, warehouses, and a loading dock were in the area. R. 229: 32.
No other cars were around. R. 229: 33. Ashley was still on the phone with her boyfriend.
R. 229: 34. Defendant got out of the car. R. 229: 34. He opened her door, pulled out a
knife, and held it to her stomach. R. 229: 35, 129. The blade was six to eight inches long,
and an inch or an inch and a half wide. R. 229: 35. He grabbed the phone and threw it on
the ground, breaking it. R. 229: 35.
Defendant motioned Ashley out of the car; she obeyed. R. 229:36. He "started trying
to take off [her] belt" and then started "motioning [her] to take [her] pants down." R. 229:
36. Ashley started taking off her pants, but defendant "ended up . . . ripping them down."
R. 229: 36-37. He pulled her pants and underpants down around her ankles. R. 229: 37.
Ashley "was like crying, kind of," asking him "why he was doing it," and "telling him to
stop." R. 229: 36-37. Defendant said only, "shut up." R. 229: 38.
Defendant pulled his own pants down and touched Ashley's vagina with his fingers.
"He just kind of—he kind of tried to put them in a little bit and was feeling around." R. 229:
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39. He turned her around, bent her over the car, and penetrated her "a little bit" with his
penis. R. 229:38-40. Defendant then got back in the car and drove away. The entire episode
lasted three to four minutes. R. 229: 40.
Ashley pulled up her pants. She picked up her phone, put it back together, called her
boyfriend, and told him what happened. R. 229: 41, 59. Ashley was "hysterical" or "in
shock," "crying and freaking out." R. 229: 65, 133, 59. He told her to calm down and get
back to the club, because she was "like hyperventilating." R. 229: 65. He said, "Walk back
to Bricks, walk back to Bricks, find a cop." R. 229: 42. It was a four-block walk on a cold
night without a coat; Ashley "wasn't really thinking about that, though." R. 229: 43.
When Ashley arrived at Bricks, a security guard there noticed that she "looked like
she had been in a scuffle." R. 229: 75. She was "very visibly upset": "[v]ery upset, very
shaken, very red, bloodshot eyes, she had been crying"; she had the appearance of someone
who "had been through something traumatic." R. 229: 85. She did not want to talk and she
was cold. R. 229: 76. Ashley told the guard that she had been raped. R. 229: 77.
Defendant spoke with police. When asked if he thought it was okay to have sex with
Ashley, he responded, "She said no." R. 229: 93. However, defendant claimed that because
the car door was open and she did not leave, she wanted to have sex with him. R. 229: 9394. When asked why he did this, defendant answered "that the reason that [he] went out and
had sex that night was because [he] was married with children and [he] had a hard time
sleeping." R. 229: 154.

5

Defendant gave his version of events at trial. He testified that Ashley had mentioned
sex, and so, after parking the car, he got out and said, "You like sexo?" R. 229:141,144-45.
He testified that she first said "no," but he asked her again and "that's when she said okay,
okay" and started pulling her pants down. R. 229: 145-46. She asked him if he preferred
inside or outside the car, and he told her outside; "that's when we had that moment." R. 229:
146-47. Defendant denied using the knife. R. 229: 147, 157.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should overrule State v. Robertson's three-part test. It meets all the criteria
announced in Menzies for overruling precedent: the test was devised without considering all
relevant authority, a majority of this Court adopted it without analysis, and the test does not
work well—in fact, reasonable doubt cases have largely ignored or criticized it. But the
test's most salient flaw is that it misstates the constitutional standard. The United States
Supreme Court has been clear that, so long as the trial court instructs the jury that the
defendant must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, trial courts need not use any
particular form of words or even define reasonable doubt at all.
In any event, the instruction given here was sound. It satisfied all requirements of the
United States Constitution and the flawed three-part test.

6

ARGUMENT
THE7?0^£7?r50iVTHREE-PARTTESTGOVERNINGREASONABLE
DOUBT INSTRUCTIONS IS CONSTITUTIONALLY FLAWED AND
SHOULD BE OVERRULED
Defendant argued in the court of appeals that the trial court's "instruction defining
reasonable doubt was defective because it did not require the State to' obviate' all reasonable
doubt and it erroneously stated that reasonable doubt was not merely a 'possibility.'" Br.
Aplt. at 13. Accordingly, defendant argued, it violated his "due process and jury trial rights"
and, as "structural error," required reversal. Id. at 13, 16.4
The court of appeals held that "[t]he reasonable doubt instruction that the trial court
gave to the jury clearly did not comport with the first and third prongs of the three-part test
as announced in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, ^f 25 n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8,
TJ 30. Although the court concluded that "Robertson is not consistent with United States
Supreme Court precedent," it nevertheless reversed and remanded for a new trial, noting that
"this court does not have the authority to overrule Robertson." Id.
This Court does have the authority to overrule Robertson and should do so.
A.

The three-part test should be overruled.

The three-part test first appeared in a majority opinion in State v. Robertson:

4

"Defendant never argued, either at trial or on appeal, that his rights under the Utah
Constitution had been violated." State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, \ 14, n.2.
7

First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's
proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Ireland, 173 P.2d at
1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Second, the instruction should
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an
instruction1 tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Third, "it is inappropriate to
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility,"
although it is permissible to instruct that a "fanciful or wholly
speculative possibility ought not to d efeat proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232. This portion of Robertson should be overruled.
Stare decisis imposes on those seeking to overturn prior precedent "a substantial
burden of persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (citing State v.
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421,427 (Utah 1986)), cert, denied 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). An American
court of last resort "will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless
clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent."
Id. at 399 (quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Rev.
367, 367 (1957)). In overruling Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the
Menzies Court noted three flaws in Justice Ellett's opinion: (1) he "not only failed to explain
why he was abandoning the long-established Hopt rule, but failed to cite that line of cases
altogether"; (2) he adopted a new rule "with little analysis and without reference to
authority"; and (3) his rule "does not work very well." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400

8

(citations omitted). Robertson's three-prong test suffers from each of these shortcomings.
In addition, it misstates the constitutional standard.
1.

The three-part test was devised without considering relevant
authority.

The three-part test announced in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997),
overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98,125, n.l 1, 61 P.3d 1000,
originated in a 1989 dissent in State v. Ireland, 713 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989). By 1989, the
Supreme Court of Utah and the Supreme Court of the United States had produced a line of
cases analyzing reasonable doubt instructions. These cases discussed such issues as "weighty
affairs" language and "possible or imaginary" doubts. The Ireland dissent not only failed to
explain its departure from these cases, it "failed to cite that line of cases altogether."
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399.
Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430 (1887), is a United States Supreme Court case
originating in the Territory of Utah. Hopt attacked a reasonable doubt instruction that
instructed the jury that if "you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the
defendant's guilt, such as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and
important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt." Id at 439.
The Supreme Court approved the language, calling it "as just a guide to practical men as can
well be given; and if it were open to criticism, it could not have misled the jury" when read
in the context of the entire instruction. Id. at 441.

9

State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541, 65 P. 494 (1901), involved an attack on "weighty affairs"
language in a reasonable doubt instruction materially identical to that approved in Hopt. 65
P. at 495. This Court held that it was very probable that the "weighty affairs" language
"would, if standing alone, have been of questionable sufficiency, yet, whether correct or not,
it could do no harm with the aid of, and in connection with, other parts of that and other
instructions given on that subject." Id. The Court cautioned against delving into subtleties
requiring "a trained classical mind":
Jurors are presumed to have common sense, and to understand the English
language, and if they cannot understand their duty when instructed that they
should not convict when they have a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt,
or of any fact necessary to prove it, they will seldom get any assistance from
such subtleties as require a trained classical mind to distinguish.
Id
In Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), the Supreme Court expressed
discomfort with an instruction comparing reasonable doubt to "the kind of doubt... which
you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be willing to act
upon." Id. at 138. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that "the instruction as given was not
of the type that could mislead the jury into finding no reasonable doubt when in fact there
was some." Id.
In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), this Court rejected a
sufficiency challenge to a burglary conviction. In describing proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, this Court stated, "Where circumstances otherwise strongly suggest guilt, the doubt

10

should be real and substantial and not one that is merely possible or imaginary." 6 Utah 2d
at 114,307 P.2d at 215. It continued, "All that is required is that the jurors have an abiding
conviction of the defendant's guilt such as they would be willing to act upon in the more
weighty and important matters relating to their own affairs." Id.
In State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985), this Court reviewed a conviction for
issuing bad checks. In the course of rejecting McClain's claim that she was entitled to a
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction, the court found no reason to suppose that the
jury "gave undue weight to the evidence by being instructed that reasonable doubt 'is not
mere possible doubt, but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more
weighty affairs of life . .. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual and substantial, not mere
possibility or speculation.'" Id. at 606.
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), this Court affirmed Tillman's
conviction and death sentence. It reviewed a challenge to a jury instruction containing
"weighty and important matters" and "possible doubt" language:
But if after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the evidence
you can truthfully say that you have an abiding conviction of the defendant's
guilt such as you would be willing to act upon in the more weighty and
important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt must be real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely
possible or imaginary.
M a t 573. A unanimous court approved the instruction. Id. It acknowledged the difficulty
of defining reasonable doubt, but held that "defendant has not come close to a showing of

11

a denial of due process because of the language used at his trial." Id. at 573, 577, 582, 583,
591.
This was the state of the law in 1989, when State v. Ireland reached this Court.
Ireland challenged a reasonable doubt instruction containing "weighty affairs" and "mere
possibility" language:
A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt, but
is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs
of life. If the mind of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration
of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt.
Doubt to be reasonable must be actual and substantial, not mere possibility or
speculation.
Ireland, 113 P.2d at 1379-80. Because this instruction was "almost identical" to the
instruction approved in Tillman, a majority of the court rejected Ireland's challenge. Id. at
1380.
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that "the instruction defining proof beyond
a reasonable doubt was erroneous." Id. at 1380. His dissenting opinion leveled three
criticisms at the instruction. First, the instruction equated proof beyond a reasonable doubt
with "an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge." Id. at 1381. Without citation to
authority, the dissent declared, "That is not the law." Id. Rather, "the instruction should
specifically state that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Id. Second, the
dissent asserted that "it is not proper to instruct a jury that a reasonable doubt is one which
'would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life.'" Id. Finally, the
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dissent asserted "that it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a
possibility." Id. at 1382.
The Ireland dissent ignored at least five controlling cases—Hopt, Neel, Sullivan,
McClain, and Tillman—that had approved reasonable doubt instructions containing the very
elements the dissent described as "clearly erroneous." Id. The dissent did cite Holland v.
United States. See id. at 1381, n.l. However, it did so as if Holland supported the dissent.
In fact, Holland held that a reasonable doubt instruction "correctly conveyed the concept of
reasonable doubt" despite equating reasonable doubt with the kind of doubt jurors might be
willing to act upon in their more serious and important affairs. Holland, 348 U.S. at 138.
The dissent made no attempt to reconcile this holding with its assertion that such an
instruction is "not proper." 773 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Despite the dissent's failure to analyze or even acknowledge controlling case law, the
majority wrote approvingly of its conclusions, and even invoked the Court's "supervisory
capacity" to direct trial courts to comply with two of the three requirements:
We do acknowledge, however, that the dissent's criticisms of the "more
weighty affairs of life" language is justified and share Justice Stewart's
concern that the "possible or imaginary" language might, by implication, be
understood to diminish the prosecution's standard of proof. Therefore, in our
supervisory capacity, we direct the trial courts to discontinue use of that
language in their instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt.
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 13 80. Other than relying on Tillman, the majority made no reference to
the case law cited above.

13

2.

A majority of this Court adopted the Ireland dissent without
analysis and without reference to authority.

The following week, Justice Stewart picked up two votes. In State v. Johnson, 114
P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), the reasonable doubt instruction contained the "weighty affairs"
language condemned in the Ireland dissent. Id. at 1146. However, Johnson did not
challenge that instruction; he argued rather that the trial court should have supplemented its
reasonable doubt instruction with his proposed instruction. The lead opinion, which
represented only two justices, rejected Johnson's claim that the trial court erred in not giving
his "redundant or repetitive" proposed supplemental instruction. Id. These justices saw no
need for it where the jury was instructed "that they must acquit unless each and every element
is established by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt..." Id.
Justice Stewart concurred in the result. Id. at 1147. His opinion criticized the
reasonable doubt instruction actually given in the case as incorrect, yet concluded that its
flaws "do not rise to the level of reversible error." Id. at 1148. The opinion spoke favorably
of Johnson's proposed instruction, although it hardly embodied the principles espoused in
his Ireland dissent.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion quoted the portion of Johnson's proposed
supplemental instruction stating that reasonable doubt "is not mere possible doubt... It is
the state of the case which after the entire comparison and consideration of all of the
evidence leaves the mind[s] of the Jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge." Id. (omission in original).
14

Ironically, this excerpt from Johnson's proposed instruction contains the very "abiding
conviction" language that Justice Stewart had in Ireland declared was "not the law." Ireland,
113 P.2d at 1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Johnson's instruction also states that reasonable
doubt "is not mere possible doubt," yet the Ireland dissent declared it "inappropriate to
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility." Id. at 1382. Finally, Johnson's
proposed instruction does not state that "the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt,"
as required by the Ireland dissent. See id. In short, Johnson's proposed instruction violated
every stricture of the Ireland dissent except one (it contained no "weighty affairs" language).
Yet Justice Stewart's concurrence concluded that, while Johnson's proposed instruction "also
leaves something to be desired, it comes closer to conveying the essential meaning of the
legal concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Johnson, 11A P.2d at 1148 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
Two justices joined this concurrence, effectively making it the majority opinion on
this point.

See id. at 1149.

No justice noted the contradiction between the

Johnson concurrence and the Ireland dissent, and no justice analyzed or even acknowledged
the long line of controlling authority cited above.
Four years later, the Ireland dissent, through Johnson, was cited in a majority opinion
of this Court. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993). Young attacked a reasonable
doubt instruction that stated, "[Y]ou must have greater assurance of the correctness of such
a decision than you would normally have in reaching the weighty decisions affecting your
own life." Id. at 346. Citing Justice Stewart's Johnson concurrence, the Court rejected
15

Young's challenge on the ground that the instruction "impressed upon the jurors that the
reasonable doubt standard requires greater proof than such decisions." Id. The Court added,
"No talismanic phraseology is required to articulate the reasonable doubt standard. An
instruction must merely impress upon the jurors the heavy burden the prosecution must meet
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. No justice dissented from this portion of the
opinion.
However, m State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1232 (Utah 1997), the Ireland dissent
hardened into a test. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Zimmerman observed that in
Johnson a majority of the court had "essentially adopted" the Ireland dissent, which he
proceeded to distill into a "three-part test":
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's
proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Ireland, 173 P.2d at
1381 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Second, the instruction should
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an
instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Third, "it is inappropriate to
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility,"
although it is permissible to instruct that a "fanciful or wholly
speculative p ossibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232. The instruction at issue in Robertson "met all three tests." Id.
In the case at bar, defendant argued in the court of appeals that this three-part test is
constitutional in nature and thus "defines the test for determining the constitutionality of
reasonable doubt instructions in Utah . . ." Reply at 2-3, 7. The court of appeals agreed.
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See Reyes, 2004 UT App 8,ffif14, 14 n.2, 16-22. Thus did a dissent with "weak analytical
underpinnings" metamorphose, "with little analysis and without reference to authority," into
a three-part constitutional test. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400.
3.

The three-part test does not work well.

In addition to its "weak analytical underpinnings," Robertson's three-part test "does
not work very well," as demonstrated by its subsequent history. Id. Since Robertson, Utah
courts have decided three cases challenging reasonable doubt instructions: one affirmed
without analysis on the ground that the instruction at issue was identical to the Robertson
instruction, one ignored Robertson altogether, and one—the court of appeals here—applied
but criticized the three-part test.
The first is State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d 404 (Utah 1999). It involved a
challenge to the same instruction the Court had just upheld in Robertson. The instruction
was accordingly upheld without discussion. Id. at \ 40.
The second is Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 44 P.3d 626. Carter argued that his
appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to challenge a reasonable doubt instruction
stating that "[a] reasonable doubt must be a real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely
possible or imaginary." Id. at ^ 51. Ignoring Robertson altogether, this Court found "no
constitutional deficiency in the instruction." Id.
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The third is State v. Reyes, the case at bar. The court of appeals reluctantly applied
Robertson's three-part test as a matter of stare decisis despite concluding that it "is not
consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, ^f 30.
4.

The three-part test misstates the constitutional standard.

The court of appeals was correct. While the three-part test suffers from "weak
analytical underpinnings" and "does not work very well," Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400, its
most salient flaw is that it misstates the constitutional standard.
"[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The burden of proof rests upon the
government. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,210 (1977); Lelandv. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790, 795 (1952). The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases is
"bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
However, "the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable
doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course." Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5
(1994) (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1887)). "Indeed, so long as the court
instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising
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the jury of the government's burden of proof." Id. (citations omitted). "The constitutional
question . . . is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the
instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard."
Id. at 6.
All three prongs of the three-part test misapply these principles. The first prong
declares that "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof must obviate all
reasonable doubt." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citation omitted). This directly contradicts
Victor, which states that "the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words
be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." Victor, 511 U.S. at 5.5
Though not at issue here, the second prong of the test also misstates the constitutional
standard. The second prong forbids stating "that a reasonable doubt is one which 'would

5

Even if some form of words were required, it is far from clear that obviate is the best
choice. Obviate means "To prevent by anticipating" or "make unnecessary." THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY at 861 (2d college ed. 1991). Pennsylvania is the only other
American jurisdiction to use the term as Ireland does. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 718
A.2d 768, 773 (Pa. 1998); Commonwealth v. DJ.A, 800 A.2d 965, 974 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Cf. Gray v. Nether land, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) (stating that "it violated due process for
a jury instruction to obviate the requirement that the prosecutor prove all the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt"). One Utah district judge recently recounted his
experience with the word:
Judges are timid about changing "approved" instructions. The bravest I have
been with this particular [reasonable doubt] instruction is to change the word
"obviate" to "eliminate," because when I first saw it, I didn't know what
"obviate" meant, and no jurors I asked in two straight felony trials knew what
it meant.
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite, Real World Descriptions of Legal Terms, Utah Bar Journal,
Vol. 16, No. 2 (March 2003) p.32.
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govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life,' as such an instruction tends
to trivialize the decision of whether to convict." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citation
omitted). Although such formulations are "strongly disfavored," Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d
1116, 1126 (10th Cir. 2000), the United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly approved"
them. Victor, 511 U.S. at 20; see also id. at 18 ("'Reasonable doubt' is such a doubt as
would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver and more important
transactions of life, to pause and hesitate..."); Holland, 348 U.S. at 140 ("the kind of doubt
. . . which you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be
willing to act upon"); see also Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d at 1123 ("if... you have an abiding
conviction of the defendant's guilt such as you would be willing to act upon in the more
weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt");
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d at 573 (same).
Robertson's third prong also misstates the constitutional requirement. It holds that
"it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility." Robertson,
932 P.2d at 1232 (citation omitted). Again, this directly contradicts Victor. In Victor, one
of the defendants objected "to the portion of the charge in which the judge instructed the jury
that a reasonable doubt is 'not a mere possible doubt.'" Victor, 511 U.S. at 17. The United
States Supreme Court rejected the challenge. Id. at 17. Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court,
without citing Robertson, found no constitutional deficiency in an instruction that
distinguished a reasonable doubt from "one that is merely possible or imaginary." Carter v.
Galetka, 2001 UT 96, If 51, 44 P.3d 626 (citing Victor, 511 U.S. at 19-20).
20

To the extent Robertson purports to graft technical requirements onto the established
constitutional test for reasonable doubt instructions, it should be overruled as unnecessary
and incorrect. See Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398-400.
B.

The reasonable doubt instruction given here satisfies both the
Constitution and the three-part test.

The reasonable doubt instruction given here was proper. The trial court addressed the
presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt in Instruction no. 15:
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of
innocence. A defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Where you are satisfied that a reasonable doubt exists as to
a defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to acquittal.
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require
proof to an absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which
is merely possible, since everything in human affairs is open to some possible
or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that
satisfies your mind and convinces your conscientious understanding.
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men and women and
arises from the evidence, or lack of evidence, in the case.
R. 165 (addendum B). This instruction exceeds constitutional requirements and satisfies the
three-part test.
1.

The reasonable
requirements.

doubt

instruction

satisfies

constitutional

The absence of any reference to "obviating" all reasonable doubt does not render the
instruction constitutionally infirm. As noted above, "so long as the court instructs the jury
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on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury
of the government's burden of proof." Victor, 511 U.S. at 5.
There is no "reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow
conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the [beyond a reasonable doubt] standard."
Id at 6. The jury was instructed that "[a] defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Where you are satisfied that a reasonable doubt exists as to a
defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to acquittal. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 165. Moreover, Instruction no. 14
instructed the jury that "[t]he presumption of innocence must prevail unless and until you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. The defendant is entitled
to acquittal where there is reasonable doubt as to his/her guilt." R. 164.
The "mere possibility" language in Instruction no. 15 does not offend the Due Process
Clause. In Carter v. Galetka, this Court found "no constitutional deficiency" in the
following language from a reasonable doubt instruction: "[a] reasonable doubt must be a real,
substantial doubt and not one that is merely possible or imaginary." 2001 UT 96, ^f 51 (citing
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5). In Victor v. Nebraska, the United States Supreme Court approved a
reasonable doubt instruction containing similar language:
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt;
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
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511 U.S. at 7 (emphasis omitted). This instruction was challenged on the ground that it
instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt is "not a mere possible doubt." 511 U.S. at 17.
The Court noted that "[a] fanciful doubt is not a reasonable doubt." Id. "That this is the
sense in which the instruction uses 'possible' is made clear from the final phrase of the
sentence, which notes that everything is open to some possible or imaginary doubt." Id.
The portion of Instruction no. 15 challenged here is indistinguishable from those
approved by the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court:
Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which is merely possible, since
everything in human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. . .
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men and women and
arises from the evidence, or lack of evidence, in the case.
R. 165 (addendum B) (challenged portion emphasized).

Like the Carter and Victor

instructions, this instruction contrasts reasonable doubt arising from the evidence with
"merely possible doubt," meaning, in context, "imaginary" doubt, or, in Ireland's parlance,
"fanciful or wholly speculative" doubt. 773 P.2d at 1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
It thus created no "reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to
allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the [reasonable doubt] standard."
Victor, 511 U.S. at 6. Nothing more is required.
2.

The reasonable doubt instruction satisfies Robertson's three-part
test.

In the event this Court determines that the Robertson three-part test is an appropriate
expression of the constitutional standard or is otherwise binding upon trial courts in this state,
23

it should still reverse the court of appeals. Without analysis, the court of appeals declared
that "the trial court's reasonable doubt jury instruction failed to comport with the
requirements of the three-part test set forth in Robertson and constituted a structural error
requiring reversal." Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, f 22. In fact, the instruction satisfied the threepart test and, to any extent it did not, any error was harmless.
First, the trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution was required to eliminate
all reasonable doubt. Defendant claimed that the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction
"never required the State to obviate all reasonable doubt." Br. Aplt. at 14. However, the trial
court instructed the jury that "[a] defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Where you are satisfied that a reasonable doubt exists as to a

defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to acquittal. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 165 (emphasis added). Moreover, Jury
Instruction no. 14, "Presumption of Innocence," instructed the jury that "[t]he presumption
of innocence must prevail unless and until you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the defendant. The defendant is entitled to acquittal where there is reasonable doubt
as to his/her guilt." R. 164.
These instructions informed the jury of the prosecution's burden of proving
defendant's guilt, and that, if a reasonable doubt remained, they must acquit. Nothing more
is required. That the reasonable doubt instruction did not include the word obviate is of no
moment. "No talismanic phraseology is required to articulate the reasonable doubt standard."
Young, 853 P.2d at 346.
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Second, the court's reasonable doubt instruction properly distinguished between a
"reasonable doubt" and an "imaginary doubt." It drew a clear line between "doubt
entertained by reasonable men and women and aris[ing] from the evidence, or lack of
evidence, in the case" and "possible or imaginary doubt" or doubt that is "merely possible":
Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which is merely possible, since
everything in human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. ..
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men and women and
arises from the evidence, or lack of evidence, in the case.
R. 165 (addendum B).

Defendant asserted that Instruction no. 15 "erroneously

communicated to the jury that a possibility may never constitute a reasonable doubt." Br.
Aplt. at 15-16. On the contrary, even a juror with a "trained classical mind" could not have
teased out of this instruction the rule that a possible doubt cannot be a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' order reversing defendant's
conviction. It should also do expressly what it did implicitly in Carter, repudiate the
Robertson three-part test as incorrect and unnecessary.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on / / U u g u s t 2004.
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reasonable doubt was not doubt which was merely
possible constituted a structural error requiring
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(2) trial court erred when, at the end of the trial, it
failed to reinstruct the jury on the law as it related to
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fundamental
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rule
mandating that trial court instruct the jury at the
close of evidence; and
(3) court's error was harmless.
Reversed and remanded.
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Trial court's "reasonable doubt" instruction which
failed to require the State to obviate all reasonable
doubt and incorrectly stated that reasonable doubt
was not doubt which was merely possible failed to
comport with the requirements of the test set forth
in Robertson and, thus, constituted a structural error
requiring reversal; under Robertson, reasonable
doubt instruction should specifically state that
State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt, and
it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt
is not merely a possibility.
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conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
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Before BENCH, Associate
GREENWOOD, JJ.

P.J.,

DAVIS

and

OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
f 1 Defendant, German Cruz Reyes, appeals his
conviction of two counts of aggravated sexual
assault, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated section 76-5-405 (Supp.2002).
Specifically, Defendant argues that this court should
reverse and remand for a new trial because (1) the
trial court violated Defendant's due process and jury
trial rights when it misstated the law in the jury
instruction defining reasonable doubt, and (2) the
trial court violated Utah law and Defendant's due
process right to a fair trial when it failed to instruct
the jury on the law at the close of evidence. We
reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND
If' 2 On the evening of February 14, 2002, the
victim, an eighteen-year-old female, went to Bricks
nightclub in Salt Lake City, Utah, to go dancing. At
approximately midnight, she went outside the club
to wait for her boyfriend to call her on her cellular
phone. Because the victim had consumed a few
shots of tequila, she was feeling "kind of tipsy" at
the time.
U 3 While the victim was waiting for her
boyfriend's call, Defendant drove up to the front of
the nightclub and motioned for the victim to
approach his car. The victim walked over to
Defendant and asked him for a cigarette. Defendant
instructed the victim to walk around to the
passenger side of his car. The victim got into
Defendant's car but left the passenger door open
with her feet hanging outside the car. Defendant
then started to drive away and the victim put her
feet inside the car and closed the door.
TJ 4 Defendant told the victim that he was taking
her to a gas station to buy cigarettes. On the way to

buy the cigarettes, Defendant and the victim spoke
very little because Defendant did not speak English
very well. Their conversation was limited to
exchanging their names and ages. According to the
victim, Defendant told her he was twenty-six. In
fact, Defendant was approximately forty-years-old
at the time.
T[ 5 When they were about halfway to a nearby
7-Eleven convenience store, the victim's boyfriend
called her on her cellular phone. When Defendant
and the victim arrived at the 7-Eleven, Defendant
bought cigarettes while the victim continued to
speak on the phone with her boyfriend. However,
*844 the victim never informed her boyfriend that
she was in Defendant's car.
^| 6 When Defendant got back in the car, the
victim, who was starting to feel nervous, asked
Defendant if they were going back to the nightclub.
Defendant told her that they were. On the way
back, Defendant stopped the car in an alley located
in an industrial area several blocks from Bricks
nightclub. While the victim was still on the phone to
her boyfriend, Defendant got out of the car and
opened the rear passenger door and started to look
for something on the floor behind the victim's seat.
Defendant then opened the front passenger door and
started to search the area around the victim's feet.
The victim shut the passenger door and Defendant
continued his search in the back seat. According to
the victim, Defendant then opened her door again,
held a knife to her stomach, and threw her phone to
the ground, causing it to break into pieces. Next,
Defendant made the victim get out of the car and
forced her to pull her pants down. The victim
started to cry and asked Defendant to stop.
Moments later, Defendant pulled his own pants
down and proceeded to penetrate the victim's vagina
with his fingers. Defendant then turned the victim
around and slightly penetrated the victim's vagina
with his penis. The entire incident lasted about
three or four minutes. Defendant then got back in
his car and drove away.
If 7 After Defendant left, the victim dressed, put
her phone back together, and called her boyfriend
and informed him that she had just been raped. She
then walked back to the nightclub and told a friend
what had happened. The friend located a security
guard who observed that the victim appeared to
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have been recently involved ' in a scuffle"
According to the security guard, the victim's clothes
appeared "tattered," her hair was "messed up," and
she was crying and very emotional When the
security guard asked the victim if she had been
raped, she answered "yes "
Tf 8 During Defendant's trial, he admitted he had
engaged in sexual relations with the victim, but
claimed she had consented
According to
Defendant, he asked the victim if she liked "sexo,"
and while she initially answered "no," the second
time he asked the question, she said "yes"
Defendant further claimed the victim exited his car
of her own accord and he and the victim then "tried
to have sex" Defendant denied using a knife to
force Defendant to have sex with him
| 9 On March 21, 2002, the State filed an
information chargmg Defendant with one count of
aggravated assault During Defendant's preliminary
hearing, the victim testified that Defendant had
penetrated her vagina using his fingers, an
allegation that the State had not known previously
Based on this new allegation, the trial court allowed
the State to add a second count of aggravated sexual
assault to the information
H 10 Defendant's trial began on October 31, 2002
Prior to opening statements, the trial court
proposed reading the jury eighteen preliminary
instructions
These
instructions
included
instructions on the presumption of innocence and on
the definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
Defense counsel objected to the trial court giving
the jury these preliminary instructions without also
rereading the instructions at the end of the trial The
basis for the objection was that instructing the jury
m this manner violated Utah law and Defendant's
due process rights
If 11 Defense counsel also objected to the wording
of the trial court's proposed jury instruction defining
reasonable doubt That instruction read as follows
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are m favor of innocence A defendant
is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt Where you are satisfied that a
reasonable doubt exists as to a defendant's guilt,
he/she is entitled to acquittal
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the
Copr © West 2004 No Claim
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defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require
proof to an absolute certainty Reasonable doubt
is required, not doubt which is merely possible,
since everything in human affairs is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that
satisfies your mind and convinces your
conscientious understandmg *845 Reasonable
doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men and
women and arises from the evidence, or lack of
evidence, in the case
Defense counsel claimed that this instruction was
improper because it did not meet the requirements
of the three-part test announced by the Utah
Supreme Court m State v Robertson, 932 P 2d
1219 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by
State v Weeks, 2002 UT 98,U 25 n 11, 61 P 3d
1000 Specifically, defense counsel argued that
under Robertson, the instruction was required to
contain the phrase "proof beyond reasonable doubt
obviates all reasonable doubt" and could not
contain the phrase "reasonable doubt cannot merely
be a possibility"
\ 12 The trial court overruled both of defense
counsel's objections and proceeded to read the jury
eighteen preliminary instructions Each juror was
given a written copy of these preliminary
instructions The following day, immediately prior
to closing arguments, the trial court read the jury
the remaining fourteen instructions [FN1] Agam,
each juror was provided with a written copy of
these additional instructions

FN1 These fourteen instructions did not
include an instruction on Defendant's
presumption of innocence or on the
definition of reasonable doubt
1f 13 After deliberating for approximately four
hours, the jury found Defendant guilty on both
counts The trial court sentenced Defendant to two
concurrent terms of fifteen years to life Defendant
timely filed his notice of appeal
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1] ^ 14 Defendant argues that the trial court
Orig U S Govt Works

84 P 3d 841
491 Utah Adv Rep 5, 2004 UT App 8
(Cite as: 84 P.3d 841)
violated his "due process and jury trial nghts" under
the United States Constitution [FN2] because the
trial court's jury instruction defining reasonable
doubt did not require the State to " 'obviate' all
reasonable doubt" and erroneously stated that
"reasonable doubt is
not doubt which is merely
possible " "Whether [a jury] instruction correctly
states the law is reviewable under a correction of
error standard, with no particular deference given to
the trial court's ruling" State v Archuleta, 850
P 2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted)

FN2 Although at the beginning of his brief
Defendant cites to Article I, Section 7 of
the Utah Constitution (guaranteeing that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law") and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution
(guaranteeing
criminal
defendants "the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury"),
Defendant never argued, either at trial or
on appeal, that his rights under the Utah
Constitution had been violated Therefore,
we only address Defendant's constitutional
claims that arise under the United States
Constitution See State v Seale, 853 P 2d
862, 873 n 6 (Utah 1993) (noting that
when party fails to make separate
argument
under
state
constitutional
provision, his or her claim will only be
addressed under federal constitution)

[2] K 15 Defendant further argues that when the
trial court failed to reread the preliminary jury
instructions at the close of evidence, it violated
Utah law and his due process right to a fair trial
Determining the propriety of the mstructions
submitted to the jury presents a question of law,
which we review for correctness See Ames v Maas,
846 P 2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct App 1993)
ANALYSIS
I Jury Instruction Defining Reasonable Doubt
[3] [4] [5] [6] % 16 Defendant argues that the trial
court violated his due process and jury trial rights
because it failed to adequately instruct the jury on
the definition of reasonable doubt Specifically,
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Defendant claims that the trial court's jury
instruction
on
reasonable
doubt
was
unconstitutional because the instruction failed to
require the State to " 'obviate' all reasonable doubt"
and incorrectly stated that "reasonable doubt is
not doubt which is merely possible " "[T]he Due
Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged" In re Winship, 397 U S
358, 364, 90 S Ct 1068, 1073, 25 LEd2d 368
(1970)
(emphasis
added)
"This
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement
applies
in state as well as federal proceedings" *846
Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 U S 275, 278, 113 S Ct
2078, 2080-81, 124 L E d 2 d 182 (1993) (citation
omitted) In addition, "the Fifth Amendment [due
process] requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a
jury verdict are interrelated" so that "the jury
verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" Id at
278, 113 SCt at 2081 "Denial of the right to a
jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"
qualifies as "structural error," thereby requiring
reversal Id at 281-82, 113 S Ct at 2083
[7][8] K 17 Although "[t]he beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is a requirement of due process,
the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from
defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do
so as a matter of course " Victor v Nebraska, 511
U S 1, 5, 114 SCt 1239, 1243, 127 LEd2d 583
(1994) (citation omitted) "[S]o long as the court
instructs the jury on the necessity that the
defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Constitution does not require that any
particular form of words be used in advising the
jury of the government's burden of proof" Id, 114
S Ct at 1243 (citations omitted)
% 18 In Victor, the United States Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of two reasonable
doubt jury instructions One of these mstructions
defined reasonable doubt m part as follows " 'It is
not a mere possible doubt, because everything
relatmg to human affairs
is open to some possible
or imaginary doubt' " [FN3] Id at 7, 114 SCt at
1244 The Court concluded that this definition of
reasonable doubt was constitutional See id at 17,
114 SCt at 1248-49
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FN3. The definition of reasonable doubt at
issue in this case used almost identical
language. It stated: "Reasonable doubt is
required, not doubt which is merely
possible, since everything in human affairs
is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt."
Tf 19 Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Victor
and its initial determination that no particular
words are required when instructing the jury on the
government's burden of proof, the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah
1997), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Weeks, 2002 UT 98,H 25 n. 11, 61 P.3d 1000,
without mentioning Victor, explained that it had
"essentially adopted the analysis of Justice Stewart's
dissent in State v. Ireland, ITS P.2d 1375, 1380-82
(Utah 1989), for reviewing the appropriateness of a
reasonable doubt instruction." Robertson, 932 P.2d
at 1232. According to our supreme court, this
analysis required the following three-part test:
First, "the instruction should specifically state
that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable
doubt." Second, the instruction should not state
that a reasonable doubt is one which "would
govern or control a person in the more weighty
affairs of life," as such instruction tends to
trivialize the decision of whether to convict.
Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a
reasonable doubt is not merely a possibility,"
although it is permissible to instruct that a
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought
not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id.
(citations
omitted).
Therefore,
under
Robertson, the trial court's jury instruction on
reasonable doubt was improper because it stated
that "reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which
is merely possible" and it failed to mention that the
State's burden of proof "must obviate all reasonable
doubt." Id. (citations omitted).
If 20 The State attempts to diminish the
significance of the three-part test in Robertson by
arguing that the test is not based on any
constitutional authority. First, the State claims that
the first prong of the test is inconsistent with the
United States Supreme Court's determination that a
reasonable doubt instruction does not require any
particular form of words. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5,
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim
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114 S.Ct. at 1243. Second, the State claims that the
third prong of the test misstates the standard for
analyzing the constitutionality of a reasonable doubt
instruction because "mere possibility" language was
approved by the United States Supreme Court, see
id. at 17, 114 S.Ct. at 1248-49, and by the Utah
Supreme Court. See Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96,
1f 51, 44 P.3d 626. Accordingly, in its brief, the
State asks this court to overrule Robertson, and
during oral argument, the State went so far as to
suggest *847 that Carter had effectively overruled
Robertson.
If 21 Although we agree that Victor cannot be
reconciled with the three-part test in Robertson, we
simply do not have the authority to overrule
Robertson. Only the Utah Supreme Court can
correct any deficiencies in Robertson. See Sentry
Investigations v. Davis, 841 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah
Ct.App.1992) ("The Court of Appeals simply
cannot overrule the law as announced by the highest
court in the state...."). Moreover, while it is true
that in Carter the Utah Supreme Court found "no
constitutional deficiency" in a reasonable doubt jury
instruction that stated "a reasonable doubt must be a
real, substantial doubt and not one that is merely
possible or imaginary," Carter, 2001 UT 96 at \
51, 44 P.3d 626, we do not agree with the State's
claim that this meant that Robertson had been
effectively overruled. The reason that the Carter
court upheld the reasonable doubt instruction at
issue was because a similar jury instruction that
contained the term "substantial doubt" had been
previously deemed constitutional by the United
States Supreme Court. [FN4] See id. at % 51 n. 4.
More importantly, when analyzing the reasonable
doubt instruction in Carter, the court did not
reference Robertson or its three-part test.
Therefore, we may not infer that when the court
held that the challenged reasonable doubt jury
instruction was constitutional, it was overruling
Robertson. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
398-99 (Utah 1994) (noting that under the principle
of stare decisis, a court of last resort " 'will follow
the rule of law which it has established in earlier
cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because
of changing conditions and that more good than
harm will come by departing from precedent' "
(citation omitted)).
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FN4. As noted earlier, the Supreme Court
reviewed two sets of reasonable doubt jury
instructions in Victor v. Nebraska, 511
U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583
(1994). One instruction was challenged
based on reasonable doubt being defined
in part as " ynot a mere possible doubV "
See id. at 7, 114 S.Ct. at 1244. The other
instruction was challenged based on
reasonable doubt being defined in part as
an " x actual and substantial doubV " See id.
at 18, 114 S.Ct. at 1249. It was the latter
instruction which provided the basis for
the court's decision to uphold the
reasonable doubt instruction at issue in
Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, 44 P.3d
626. See id. at1J5ln. 4.

If 22 In this case, it is clear that the trial court's
reasonable doubt jury instruction failed to comport
with the requirements of the three-part test set forth
in Robertson and constituted a structural error
requiring reversal. Although this test may be
constitutionally flawed, it is not within our power to
overrule it. Accordingly, on this issue, we reverse
and remand for a new trial.
II. Failure To Reinstruct The Jury
[9] K 23 Defendant also argues that when the trial
court failed to reread all of the preliminary jury
instructions at the close of evidence, it violated rule
17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
and his due process right to a fair trial. "We
interpret a [court] rule by examining the rule's plain
language and resort[ ] to other methods ... only if
the
language
is
ambiguous."
State
v.
Quinonez-Gaiton, 2002 UT App 273,^[ 11, 54 P.3d
139 (second and third alterations in original)
(quotations and citation omitted). Rule 17(g)
provides in relevant part as follows:
After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the
trial shall proceed in the following order:
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct the
jury;
Utah R.Crim. P. 17(g)(6) (emphasis added).

Page 7

If 24 The plain language of this rule indicates that
a trial court must instruct the jury at the close of
evidence. Although the trial court is also required
to instruct the jury at "any other appropriate time,"
we do not construe this to mean, as the State
contends, that a trial court can adhere to the rule by
giving the jury some of its instructions before
opening statements (an "appropriate time") and the
rest of its instructions before closing arguments
("[w]hen the evidence is concluded"). Utah
R.Crim. P. 17(g)(6). The *848 use of the mandatory
word "shall" along with the conjunction "and"
demonstrates that such an interpretation is not
plausible. Id. Were we to accept the State's
argument, a trial court could comply with rule
17(g)(6) by reading all but one of the jury
instructions at the beginning of the trial and save
one remaining instruction for after the close of
evidence; a result clearly not allowed by the
drafters of the rule.
1f 25 The State also argues that because rule 19(a)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
allows a trial court to provide the jury with
preliminary instructions prior to opening statements,
[FN5] the trial court in this case was not required to
repeat these instructions to the jury after the close of
evidence. Again, we find the State's argument
unpersuasive. In State v. Marquez, 135 Ariz. 316,
660 P.2d 1243 (Ct.App.1983), the court considered
whether the trial court erred when it instructed the
jury on the State's burden of proof at the opening of
the trial but failed to do so after the close of
evidence. See id. at 1247. As part of its analysis,
the court examined Arizona Rule of Criminal
Procedure 18.6(c), which contains language similar
to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(a). Rule
18.6(c) states: " 'Immediately after the jury is
sworn, the court shall instruct the jury concerning
its duties, its conduct, the order of proceedings, and
the elementary legal principles that will govern
proceedings.' " Marquez, 660 P.2d at 1248 (citation
omitted). The court interpreted this rule as follows:

FN5. Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides in relevant
part as follows:
After the jury is sworn and before opening
statements, the court may instruct the jury
concerning the jurors' duties and conduct,

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

84 P 3d 841
491 Utah Adv Rep 5, 2004 UT App 8
(Cite as: 84 P.3d 841)
the order of proceedings, the elements and
burden of proof for the alleged crime, and
the definition of terms The court may
instruct the jury concerning any matter
the court in its discretion believes will
assist the jurors m comprehending the
case
In order that there be no further confusion, we
hold that the preliminary instruction of the jury,
authorized by Rule 18 6(c), Rules of Cnmmal
Procedure, is for the purpose of preparing the
jury for the trial and constitutes an orientation
process by which the jury is made to understand
its duties and responsibilities Where elementary
legal principles that will govern the proceedings
are given to the jury as a part of the orientation,
the trial judge must repeat all such legal
principles in its charge to the jury, where such
legal principles mclude matters of law vital to the
rights of a defendant
Id at 1249, see also State v Comen, 50 Ohio
St 3d 206, 553 N E 2d 640, 644 (1990) (noting that
"[i]f the preliminary or cautionary instructions
include matters of law vital to the rights of a
defendant, the trial court is not excused from
including or repeating all such instructions after the
arguments are completed")
[10][11][12] \ 26 Like Arizona's rule 18 6(c),
Utah's rule 19(a) permits a trial court to provide
jurors, as part of their orientation, with preliminary
instructions on matters that the court "believes will
assist the jurors in comprehending the case " Utah
R C n m P 19(a) Although the rule authorizes a
trial court to instruct the jury not only on procedural
matters but also on matters relating to the
fundamental rights of a defendant, such as "the
elements and burden of proof for the alleged
crime," id, it does not supercede the plain and
unambiguous mandate contained m rule 17(g)(6)
that the jury be instructed at the close of evidence
In other words, while it is permissible, and we
believe appropriate, for a trial court to provide the
jury with preliminary instructions on "matters of
law vital to the rights of a defendant," Marquez, 660
P 2d at 1249, such as the presumption of innocence
and the State's burden of proof, in order to fully
comply with rule 17(g)(6), the court must repeat
these instructions at the close of evidence [FN6] Id
Accordmgly, we hold *849 that the trial court erred
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when, at the end of the trial, it failed to reinstruct
the jury on the law as it related to Defendant's
fundamental nghts [FN7]

FN6 We note that requiring a trial court to
reinstruct the jury at the end of the trial is
consistent with the approach taken by
courts in other jurisdictions that have
interpreted rules similar to rule 17(g)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure See
eg, State v Jackson, 144 Ariz 53, 695
P2d 742, 743 (1985) (concluding that trial
court is required, under Arizona Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to "instruct the jury at
end of evidence and oral argument"),
Bennett v State, 302 Ark 179, 789
S W 2 d 436, 438 (1990) (concludmg that
statute, which read " When the evidence
is concluded, the court shall, on motion of
either party, instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case,' " was "so clear that
it did not need interpretation" (citation
omitted)), Little v State, 230 GaApp
803, 498 S E 2 d 284, 287 (1998) (noting
that in light of statute that provided that
"the trial court shall instruct the jury in the
law after the closing arguments are
completed," preliminary instructions could
not "serve as a substitute for a complete
jury charge, as the statute requires, after
the evidence is closed and arguments
concluded"
(quotations and
citations
omitted)), State v Comen, 50 Ohio St 3d
206, 553 N E 2 d 640, 644 (1990) (holding,
under Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure,
that although trial court may give jury
preliminary instructions, "[ajfter arguments
are completed, [the] trial court must fully
and completely give the jury all
instructions which are relevant and
necessary for the jury to weigh the
evidence and discharge its duty as fact
finder"), State v Nelson, 587 N W 2 d
439, 444 (SD1998) (construing word
"shall" as "a mandatory directive" in a
statute that read " 'The court shall read its
instructions to the jury' at the close of the
evidence and before final argument"
(citation omitted))
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FN7. Because we hold that the trial court's
failure to reinstruct the jury violated rule
17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, we do not address Defendant's
argument that the trial court's failure to
reinstruct the jury also violated his due
process right to a fair trial.

[13][14] 1f 27 Having determined that the trial
court erred when it failed to repeat its preliminary
jury instructions at the close of evidence, we must
ascertain whether this error was harmful. In order
for an error to be harmful, "the likelihood of a
different outcome must be sufficiently high to
undermine confidence in the verdict." State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also
Utah R.Crim. P. 30(a) ("Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.").
^ 28 Based on our review of the record, we cannot
say that had the trial court repeated the preliminary
jury instructions at the close of evidence, the verdict
in this case would have been any different. The
time period separating the trial court's reading of the
preliminary instructions from the close of evidence
was less than twenty-four hours. Moreover, when
the jurors retired to deliberate, they were provided
with a written copy of every preliminary and final
jury instruction. Finally, despite Defendant's
assertions to the contrary, this case was not a close
credibility contest over the issue of consent. Other
than Defendant's testimony, all of the relevant
evidence demonstrates that the victim engaged in
sex against her will. The victim had known
Defendant for less than half-an-hour. She
immediately reported the incident to her boyfriend
and told him and the security guard at Bricks
nightclub that she had just been raped. Finally, the
security guard confirmed that it appeared that the
victim had recently been in "a scuffle" when he saw
her and that she appeared to him to be extremely
upset and emotional.
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CONCLUSION
\ 30 The reasonable doubt instruction that the trial
court gave to the jury clearly did not comport with
the first and third prongs of the three-part test as
announced in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,
1232 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98,1} 25 n. 11, 61 P.3d
1000. Although Robertson is not consistent with
United States Supreme Court precedent, this court
does not have the authority to overrule Robertson.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
TI 31 In addition, we conclude that the trial court
violated rule 17(g)(6) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure when it failed to repeat those preliminary
jury instructions that related to Defendant's
fundamental rights. However, in light of the
evidence in this case, the short time between the
preliminary instructions and the close of evidence,
and the fact that the jurors were provided with
written copies of all of the jury instructions, we are
confident that the trial court's error did not influence
the jury verdict. Therefore, the trial court's error
was harmless.

*850 f 32 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH
, Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS
, Judge.
84 P.3d 841, 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 2004 UT App 8
END OF DOCUMENT

f 29 Therefore, we conclude that although the
trial court erred when it failed to reinstruct the jury
at the close of evidence, this did not affect the jury's
verdict. Accordingly, the trial court's error was
harmless.
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Addendum B

Addendum B

INSTRUCTION NO.

BURDEN OP PROOF

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence,
are in favor of innocence.

A defendant is presumed

innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Where you are satisfied that a reasonable doubt exists
as to a defendant's guilt, he/she is entitled to
acquittal.
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty. Reasonable doubt is required, not doubt which
is merely possible, since everything in human affairs is
open to some possible or imaginary doubt.

Proof beyond

a reasonable doubt is a degree of proof that satisfies
your mind and convinces your conscientious understanding.
Reasonable doubt is doubt entertained by reasonable men
and women and arises from the evidence, or lack of
evidence, in the case.

